This paper studies the role of commitment in the design of enforcement mechanisms when enforcement can remedy harm from non-compliance. We consider a game between an enforcement authority ("enforcer") and an offender in which either the enforcer or the offender may act as a Stackelberg leader. The enforcer must choose whether to move first by committing to an enforcement strategythereby directly affecting the level of non-compliance; or rather let the offender make the first move-thereby calibrating the level of enforcement to the actual level of non-compliance. We show that the value of commitment to the enforcer depends on each player's responsiveness to a change in the other player's strategy choice. Commitment to an enforcement strategy is thus not always in the enforcer's interest.
Introduction
Should enforcement authorities commit to an investigation policy or rather choose the level of investigation in response to the severity of non-compliance? This paper considers cases in which-as with most property crimes-detection of the o¤ender remediates harm from non-compliance. The enforcement authority thus faces the dilemma of either committing to a (non-discriminatory) investigation strategy or choosing the level of investigation in response to the actual level of non-compliance. The paper explores the di¤erent trade-o¤s between deterrence and enforcement costs associated with each of these investigation strategies.
To illustrate this dilemma, suppose the Criminal Investigation Division of the EPA considers an enforcement policy. One alternative is to announce a plan to investigate a class of pollution incidents involving a single, identi…able, polluter-such as oil spills and toxic wastes-irrespective of their severity. A commitment to a strict, uniform enforcement policy deters polluters, but also involves excessive level of enforcement. Another alternative is to decide on the intensity of the investigation in response to the severity of the pollution; for example, the size of the spill or the magnitude of the waste. In the absence of commitment to an enforcement strategy, a potential polluter must decide whether, and how much, to pollute in anticipation of the Division's best response. The Division, in turn, can adjust the intensity of its investigation to the severity of the pollution.
As another example, suppose the Criminal Investigation Division of a state police has to choose an enforcement strategy. In an attempt to deter property crimes, the Division may announce, and commit to, a uniform investigation policy of a class of property crimes such as thefts involving more than $100,000. Alternatively, the Division may choose the level of investigation after having observed the gravity of the crime; for example, the amount stolen. By refraining from committing to an investigation strategy, the Division induces a potential thief to take into account the e¤ect of his decision on the Division's choice of level of investigation.
To understand the choice between these di¤erent investigation strategies, consider their e¤ects on potential o¤enders as well as on the costs of enforcement. By committing to an investigation strategy, the enforcement authority directly a¤ects the level of non-compliance, but overspends enforcement resources relative to the actual level of non-compliance. By choosing the level of investigation retrospectively, in contrast, the enforcement authority calibrates the level of investigation to the actual level of noncompliance, but only indirectly a¤ects the level of non-compliance. The paper's main argument is that the no one investigation strategy is superior to the other. In particular, the enforcement authority might do better by letting the o¤ender move …rst might rather than taking the lead by committing to an investigation strategy.
A key assumption in our analysis is that the enforcement authority commits to a uniform enforcement scheme-i.e., a scheme which speci…es the same level of investigation for di¤erent levels of non-compliance. Although enforcement authorities may be able to commit to a more nuanced enforcement scheme than that we consider here, there likely exist constraints on the design of optimal commitment. For example, a commitment to an enforcement strategy can be obtained by entering into contracts with human employ-ees. However, an enforcement authority might not be able to condition its contracts on the actual level of non-compliance. The trade-o¤ we identify between commitment and ‡exibility thus characterizes the choice faced by an enforcement authority which cannot commit to a fully contingent enforcement scheme. It thereby highlights more generally the bene…t and cost of commitment in various enforcement contexts.
To study the role of commitment in enforcement, we consider a game between an enforcement authority (enforcer) and an o¤ender in which either the enforcer or the o¤ender may act as a Stackelberg leader. An o¤ender-leadership game captures a strategic interaction in which the enforcer chooses an enforcement strategy after having observed the o¤ender's choice of non-compliance. The possibility that the o¤ender acts as a Stackelberg leader has been previously dismissed on the grounds that an o¤ender cannot credibly commit to performing an illegal act and therefore his strategy is neither observable nor irreversible (Avenhaus et al., 1998, p. 29) .
1 But as the examples above illustrate, the observability and irreversibility of the o¤ender's strategy are often a result of the fact that non-compliance itself is observable and irrevocable. Accordingly, the o¤ender need not commit to a non-compliance strategy to render his choice irreversible; rather, he should simply engage in non-compliance.
The essential features of the game between the enforcer and the o¤ender are as follows. Both the o¤ender's gains and the enforcer's harm are increasing with the o¤ender's level of non-compliance. Detection of the o¤ender remediates or prevents a certain fraction of the harm from non-compliance as well as eliminates the o¤ender's gain; for example, detected o¤enders can be forced to pay for clean-up costs or to return their loot. Detection of the o¤ender also subjects the o¤ender to a sanction whose magnitude is proportional to the level of non-compliance. We assume that the o¤ender's gains are strictly increasing and concave in the level of non-compliance and the enforcer's costs are strictly increasing and convex in the probability of detection. This implies that the o¤ender's optimal level of non-compliance is decreasing with the enforcer's level of enforcement and that the enforcer's optimal level of enforcement is increasing with the o¤ender's level of non-compliance. Thus, from the o¤ender's perspective, this is a game with strategic substitutes, whereas from the enforcer's perspective, this is a game with strategic complements.
The players'objectives depend on the sequence of moves in the game, which re ‡ects the information each player possesses on the other player's strategy as well as the players' ability to commit to a strategy. To facilitate the comparison between the enforcer-and the o¤ender-leadership games, we compare the equilibrium in each of these games to the equilibrium in a simultaneous-move game. In a simultaneous-move game, the o¤ender and enforcer choose their strategies without observing the other player's strategy choice. Enforcement in a simultaneous-move game accordingly takes the form of monitoring noncompliance: employing enforcement resources to detect non-compliance. Although the enforcement technology may be di¤erent in a simultaneous-move game, the equilibrium of this game serves as a useful benchmark for comparing the Stackelberg equilibria of the sequential games.
In an enforcer-leadership game, the enforcer commits to an observable investigation strategy. The enforcer's commitment is unconditional on the actual level of noncompliance; for example, the enforcer may spend enforcement resources before the offender chooses a level of non-compliance (we comment later on the possibility that the enforcer commits to a conditional enforcement scheme). The o¤ender, having observed the enforcer's committed level of enforcement, then chooses a level of non-compliance. The enforcer's objective is to minimize the sum of expected harm from non-compliance and enforcement costs by a¤ecting the level of non-compliance (strategic e¤ect) and by adjusting the level of enforcement to the o¤ender's equilibrium level of non-compliance (direct e¤ect). Because the enforcer can secure her Nash equilibrium payo¤ by choosing her Nash equilibrium strategy, she enjoys a …rst-mover advantage relative to a simultaneous-move game. To realize this advantage, the enforcer chooses a higher level of enforcement than the Nash equilibrium level. The o¤ender's best response is to choose a lower level of noncompliance than the Nash equilibrium level. The o¤ender therefore su¤ers a second-mover disadvantage as compared to a simultaneous-move game.
In an o¤ender-leadership game, the o¤ender engages in non-compliance in an irrevocable and observable way. The enforcer, having observed the o¤ender's level of noncompliance, then chooses a level of investigation. The o¤ender's objective is to maximize his net gains from non-compliance by a¤ecting the level of enforcement (strategic e¤ect) and by adjusting the level of non-compliance to the enforcer's equilibrium level of enforcement (direct e¤ect). Because the o¤ender can secure his Nash equilibrium payo¤ by choosing his Nash equilibrium strategy, the o¤ender enjoys a …rst-mover advantage relative to a simultaneous game. To realize this advantage, the o¤ender chooses a lower level of non-compliance than the Nash equilibrium level. The enforcer's best response is to choose a lower level of enforcement than the Nash equilibrium level. The enforcer therefore enjoys a second-mover advantage as compared to a simultaneous game.
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The o¤ender' s choice as a leader to curb the level of non-compliance, and the enforcer' s in-kind response as a follower, may help to explain anecdotal observations on the relationship between enforcement authorities and crime organizations. According to a common perception, enforcement authorities and crime organizations often adhere to a tacit agreement whereby the enforcement authority refrains from, or scale back, enforcement so long as the crime organization restrains its criminal activity. These implicit agreements can be interpreted as strategic interactions in which the crime organization …rst decides on the level of non-compliance and the enforcement authority chooses in response an optimal level of enforcement.
The arguments above establish that the enforcer's equilibrium payo¤ is higher either as a leader or as a follower than in a simultaneous-move game. Whether the enforcer's equilibrium payo¤ is higher as a leader or as a follower depends on the relation between her …rst-versus second-mover advantage. The enforcer's advantage as a leader relative to a simultaneous-move game is that she can directly induce the o¤ender to choose a lower level of non-compliance. The equilibrium level of enforcement, however, is excessive relative to the equilibrium level of non-compliance. The enforcer's advantage as a follower relative to a simultaneous-move game is that the o¤ender, anticipating the enforcer's response, chooses a lower level of non-compliance. The enforcer as a follower, moreover, chooses an optimal level of enforcement in response to the o¤ender's choice of level of non-compliance. This implies that, although the level of non-compliance is lower in both leadership games relative to a simultaneous-move game, the level of enforcement is calibrated to the level of non-compliance only in an o¤ender-leadership game. It follows that, if the level of noncompliance in an o¤ender-leadership game is not excessively higher than in an enforcerleadership game, the enforcer's equilibrium payo¤ is higher as a follower than as a leader.
The level of non-compliance in each of the leadership games depends on the responsiveness of the follower to the leader's strategy. The more responsive the o¤ender-follower is to a change in the level of enforcement, the lower is the equilibrium level of non-compliance (because the enforcer as a leader can relatively inexpensively induce the o¤ender to reduce the level of non-compliance). Similarly, the less responsive the enforcer-follower is to a change in the level of non-compliance, the lower is the equilibrium level of non-compliance (because the o¤ender as a leader has to signi…cantly lower the level of non-compliance to induce the enforcer to reduce the level of enforcement). It follows that the enforcer prefers to move …rst if both players are relatively responsive to a change in the other player's level of activity; and prefers to move second if both players are relatively unresponsive to a change in the other player's level of activity.
We show, in particular, that the enforcer is better o¤ refraining from committing to an enforcement strategy if the sanction for non-compliance is su¢ ciently low. In this case, because the expected sanction for non-compliance does not vary much with the level of enforcement, the o¤ender is relatively unresponsive to a change in the level of enforcement. As a result, the enforcer as a leader has little power to deter non-compliance. If the o¤ender moves …rst, in contrast, he takes into account the fact that increasing the level of non-compliance increases the probability of forfeiting his gains. To maximize his expected payo¤ from non-compliance, the o¤ender has an incentive to choose a lower level of non-compliance than in an enforcer-leadership game. The enforcer is consequently better o¤ letting the o¤ender move …rst.
The enforcer is better o¤ committing to an enforcement strategy, in contrast, if the marginal enforcement cost increases at a slow rate with the probability of detection. The enforcer's best response in this case is to intensely investigate if the level of non-compliance is high (because the marginal bene…t from enforcement is high), but to spend little on investigation if the level of non-compliance is low (because the marginal bene…t from enforcement is low). Because the enforcer is relatively responsive to a change in the level of non-compliance, the o¤ender as a leader can induce the enforcer to signi…cantly ease up on enforcement by slightly reducing his level of non-compliance. If the enforcer moves …rst, however, she can choose a su¢ ciently high level of enforcement, thereby inducing a lower level of non-compliance than in an o¤ender-leadership game. The enforcer's ability to commit to an enforcement strategy is thus highly valuable.
To further explore the strategic di¤erences between the two leadership games, we compare the e¤ect of an increase in the magnitude of the sanction, the magnitude of the harm, or the cost of the sanction on the equilibrium strategies and payo¤s. We show that the e¤ect of an increase in the sanction or the harm on the enforcer' s level of enforcement depends on whether the enforcer leads or follows, but always lowers the o¤ender' s level of noncompliance. We further show that, as the magnitude of the harm increases, the enforcer' s equilibrium payo¤ as a leader may surprisingly increase; and that as the cost of the sanction to the enforcer increases, the o¤ender' s equilibrium payo¤ as a follower may nevertheless decrease.
Finally, to illustrate one of the paper' s main insights, consider the enforcement crusade launched by Mexican President Felipe Calderón against drug tra¢ cking in the end of 2006. This policy change of the Mexican government amounted to a commitment to a higher level of enforcement, intended to bring down the level of crime. In the years that followed the initiation of the enforcement campaign, however, the level of violence has surprisingly increased. This paper sheds some light on the increase in the level of non-compliance which followed the intensi…ed enforcement e¤orts. As we show in the paper, an o¤ender-follower might choose a higher level of non-compliance than an o¤ender-leader. Transforming an o¤ender-leadership game into an enforcerleadership game might accordingly result in a higher level of non-compliance.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 surveys the related literature (some readers may prefer to read this section after having read the rest of the paper). Section 3 sets up the model. Section 4 characterizes the equilibrium outcomes in simultaneous and sequential games. Section 5 compares the enforcer' s equilibrium payo¤ and the enforcer' s and the o¤ender' s equilibrium strategies in the sequential games. Section 6 concludes.
Related Literature
This paper is related to the literature on the economics of crime, initiated by Becker (1968). Becker's paper has spawned a large literature which investigates a sequential game in which a benevolent enforcer acts as a Stackelberg leader by committing to an enforcement strategy. Underlying this literature is the assumption that non-compliance always results in harm and, accordingly, that enforcement aims solely at deterrence, rather than preventing or remedying harm from non-compliance (see, e.g., Polinsky and Shavell, 2007) . 3 Here we adopt an alternative assumption-common in the literature on inspection games-that, in addition to detecting and punishing o¤enders, enforcement either remediates or prevents a portion of the harm from non-compliance; this assumption seems particularly plausible in property crimes such as theft and embezzlement. That enforcement may remediate harm from non-compliance gives rise to the possibility that the enforcer spends enforcement resources without resorting to commitment power.
Within the economics of crime literature, Mookherjee and Png (1992) and Shavell (1991) are particularly related to this paper. Mookerjee and Png consider the optimal mix of investigation and monitoring, whereas Shavell compares the optimal sanction under general versus speci…c enforcement. These papers stand out in that they model explicitly the method of enforcement. In contrast to this paper, however, both these papers assume that enforcement is aimed solely as a deterrent against non-compliance rather than for the prevention or remediation of harm. More important, both papers implicitly assume that the enforcer acts as a Stackelberg leader. 4 This paper also shares similar features with Reinganum (1993) , who considers a two-stage model of enforcement and plea bargain. In contrast to Reinganum's model, however, this paper focus on a sequential-rather than a simultaneous-enforcement game, and derives best response functions from a general non-compliance technology. This paper is also related to the literature on inspection games, which spans a wide range of applications (Graetz et al., 1986 , Chander and Wilde, 1992 Besanko and Spulber, 1989; Borch, 1990) . This literature has considered a game in which the enforcer and the o¤ender act simultaneously (see, e.g., Avenhaus et al., 1998) . Enforcement in inspection games is designed to prevent ongoing harm from noncompliance or to avert harm from future non-compliance, rather than merely to detect and to sanction past non-compliance (as in the economics of crime literature). This paper di¤ers from the literature on inspection games in two main respects. First, this literature has largely dismissed the possibility of an o¤ender-leadership game because an o¤ender supposedly cannot credibly commit to performing an illegal act. 5 As we argued in the Introduction, 6 however, the o¤ender need not commit to a non-compliance strategy to render his strategy irreversible; rather, the o¤ender simply has to engage in non-compliance in an irreversible way. Second, whereas the literature on inspection games has assumed that enforcement is designed to detect non-compliance-we de…ne such enforcement as monitoring-here we focus on the case in which enforcement is designed to detect and apprehend the o¤ender as well as collect evidence that would facilitate his punishment-we de…ne such enforcement as investigation.
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This paper shares similar features with papers which examine the order of play in duopoly games and contests.
8 These papers, as does this paper, compare the players'equilibrium payo¤s under di¤erent timing schemes (see Gal-Or, 1985; Hamilton and Slutsky, 1990; Dixit, 1987; Baik and Shogren, 1992) . Our results on the nature of the enforcer's …rst-and second-mover advantages, moreover, rest on considerations similar to those in Dixit's and Baik and Shogren's papers. However, the derivation and interpretation of the players'reaction curves, as well as their shapes, are di¤erent in this paper;
4 Mookerjee and Png (1992) assume that the enforcer can commit to a schedule of enforcement strategies so that the level of enforcement is conditioned on the level of non-compliance (a similar assumption is made in the literature on marginal deterrence-see, for example, Polinsky and Shavell, 2007, pp. 432-34) . Here, by contrast, we restrict attention to unconditional commitment to enforcement strategy, which requires a much weaker commitment power on the part of the enforcer.
5 "The notion of leadership . . . is particularly suitable for inspection games since an inspector can credibly announce his strategy and stick to it, whereas the inspectee cannot do so if he intends to act illegally." (Avenhaus et al., 1998, p. 29; emphasis added) . 6 See f.n. 1. 7 Cf. Mookherjee and Png (1992) who de…ne investigation as enforcement activity whose level depends on information on the severity of the o¤ense. 8 We use the notion of …rst-and second-mover advantage in a slightly di¤erent sense than the literature on duopoly games. According to this literature, a …rm has a …rst-mover (second-mover) advantage if its Stackelberg-leader payo¤ is higher (lower) than its Stackelberg-follower payo¤. Here, by contrast, we follow Turocy and von Stengel (2009; p. 26) in saying that a player has a …rst-mover (secondmover) advantage if his Stackelberg-leader (Stackelberg-follower) payo¤ is higher than his payo¤ in a simultaneous-move game.
in particular, the slopes of the reaction curves here have opposite signs and are globally monotone, whereas the slopes of the reaction curves are not predetermined in duopoly games and are not globally monotone in contests.
9 More important, the question of endogenous timing does not arise in our model because we assume that the enforcer can unilaterally dictate the sequence of moves in the game. In duopoly games and contests, in contrast, a …rm or a contestant cannot unilaterally choose to be a leader or a follower.
Model
Consider two strategic, risk-neutral players: an o¤ender (he) and an enforcer (she). The o¤ender's strategy, q 2 [0; 1], is a level of non-compliance (or an o¤ense seriousness). Noncompliance in ‡icts harm on the enforcer. The harm from non-compliance is proportional to the level of non-compliance and is given by qH, where H > 0.
10 The enforcer's strategy, p 2 [0; 1], is a probability of detection. Detection of the o¤ender remediates or prevents a fraction 2 (0; 1] of the harm from non-compliance (for example, a detected thief can be forced to return a portion of his loot). Detection of the o¤ender also subjects the o¤ender to a sanction. The sanction for non-compliance is proportional to the level of non-compliance and is given by qS, where S > 0.
11 If the o¤ender is detected, his illicit gains are forfeited. For example, detected polluters could be forced to disgorge their illegal pro…ts from pollution. Similarly, convicted thieves put behind bar can no longer bene…t from their loot, even if not all of it is returned. Our result would not change if we assumed instead that only a fraction of the o¤ender' s gains are forfeited.
12 For simplicity, we assume that the sanction and forfeiture are costless to the enforcer.
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The o¤ender's gains from non-compliance are given by G(q), where G 0 (q) 0 and G 00 (q) < 0; that is, the gains from non-compliance are (weakly) increasing at a decreasing rate in the level of non-compliance. We normalize the maximum level of non-compliance to 1 by assuming that G 0 (1) = 0. The costs to the enforcer of detecting the o¤ender with probability p are given by c(p), where c 0 (p) > 0 and c 00 (p) > 0; that is, the costs of enforcement are increasing at an increasing rate with the probability of detection.
9 Pro…ts in both inspection games and contests are monotone decreasing in rival's action. Reaction curves, by contrast, need not be monotone in contests. 10 We follow the literature on inspection games in assuming that the o¤ender's gains from noncompliance do not a¤ect the enforcer's payo¤. Our results would continue to hold if we assumed instead, as the literature on the economics of crime generally does, that the enforcer's payo¤ incorporates these gains.
11 The assumption that the harm and sanction are linear in the level of non-compliance is made to simplify the analysis, but it su¢ ces that they are convex in the level of non-compliance. 12 The assumption that a detected o¤ender forfeits her entire gains is made for simplicity, but there need not be any relationship between the fraction of the harm prevented or remediated by enforcement and the fraction of the for…eted gains. More generally, if a detected o¤ender retained a portion 1 of his gains, then his gains from non-compliance
, where G is the o¤ender' s concave utility function (see below).
13 The sanction does not a¤ect the enforcer's payo¤ if it is not paid to the enforcer. If, in contrast, the sanction is paid to the enforcer (e.g., a …ne), then assume the enforcer internalizes the o¤ender's burden of paying the …ne. In Appendix C we consider the case in which the sanction is costly to the enforcer.
We assume that the cost of detecting non-compliance is independent of the level of non-compliance (i.e., @ 2 c(p) @p@q = 0). This assumption allows us to de…ne the enforcer' s strategy as a probability of detection, rather than a cost of enforcement. To ensure an interior solution for the enforcer's equilibrium strategy in a simultaneous-move game, we assume that c 0 (0) < H. For simplicity, we assume that the costs of enforcement are independent of the enforcement technology-investigation or monitoring.
14 The o¤ender's and enforcer's payo¤s functions are given by
( 1) and
The o¤ender's payo¤ is equal to the expected gains from non-compliance less the expected sanction for non-compliance. The enforcer's payo¤ is equal to the expected harm from non-compliance less the costs of enforcement. We proceed by considering the players' reaction curves. Throughout the paper, we use subscripts to denote partial derivatives.
Best-Response Functions
Consider …rst the o¤ender's best response function, q br (p): the o¤ender's optimal level of non-compliance as a function of the enforcer's probability of detection. The o¤ender's problem is to choose q to maximize (1). Di¤erentiating (1) with respect to q gives
The …rst term is the o¤ender's marginal bene…t from increasing the level of noncompliance discounted by the probability of non-detection. The second term is the o¤ender's marginal cost from the increased expected punishment. If p = 0 (i.e., no enforcement), the o¤ender's level of non-compliance satis…es G 0 (q) = 0; the o¤ender's best response is therefore q = 1 (recall that G 0 (1) = 0). In contrast, if p is su¢ ciently high, the o¤ender chooses q = 0 (i.e., full compliance). Speci…cally, let e p be the value of
). Then, because v q 0 for all p 2 [e p; 1], the o¤ender's best response to p 2 [e p; 1] is q = 0; e p is thus the minimal probability of detection that induces full compliance. For p 2 [0; e p), the o¤ender's optimal choice of q satis…es v q = 0:
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The o¤ender's best response function is therefore
for S (from the o¤ender's FOC) and rearranging we have
(5) implies that, for p 2 [0; e p); the o¤ender's best response is monotone decreasing with the enforcer's probability of detection. This re ‡ects the notion that, from the o¤ender's perspective, this is a game with strategic substitutes: the more aggressive the enforcer is, the less aggressive the o¤ender will be. 16 Next, consider the enforcer's best response function, p br (q): the enforcer's optimal probability of detection as a function of the o¤ender's level of non-compliance. The enforcer's problem is to choose p to maximize (2). Di¤erentiating (2) with respect to p yields
The …rst term is the enforcer's marginal cost of increasing the probability of detection; the second term is the enforcer's marginal bene…t from the prevention of harm. Let q be the value of q that satis…es c
). Then, the enforcer's best response to q 2 [0; q] is p = 0 (i.e., no enforcement). This follows because, for a su¢ ciently low level of non-compliance, the enforcer's marginal bene…t from the prevention or remediation of harm is lower than the marginal cost. For q 2 (q; 1], the enforcer's optimal choice of p satis…es u p = 0:
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The enforcer's best response function is therefore
Implicitly di¤erentiating
, and rearranging we have dp br (q) dq
(8) implies that, for q 2 (q; 1], the enforcer's best response is monotone increasing with the o¤ender's level of non-compliance. This re ‡ects the notion that, from the enforcer's perspective, this is a game with strategic complements: the more aggressive the o¤ender is, the more aggressive the enforcer will be.
Finally, by the envelope theorem: dv(q br (p); p) dp
16 The de…nitions of strategic substitutes and strategic complements (which we discuss below) was introduced in Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer (1985) in relation to duopoly games. 17 Observe that, since c 00 (p) > 0; u pp < 0 for all p:
and du(q; p br (q)) dq
That both players' expected payo¤s decrease along their reaction curves (i.e., as the other player's strategy increases) re ‡ect the notion that this is a game of competition.
The following observation summarizes the essential features of the game.
Observation: The game between the enforcer and the o¤ender is a game of con‡ict in which, for strictly positive levels of non-compliance and enforcement, the players' strategies are complements from the perspective of the enforcer and substitutes from the perspective of the o¤ender.
We proceed by comparing three game con…gurations: a simultaneous-move game, a sequential game with enforcer-leadership, and a sequential game with o¤ender-leadership; we will use the superscripts n, e, and o, respectively, to denote these games. To facilitate the comparison between the di¤erent games, we assume that enforcement costs do not depend on the enforcement technology-monitoring or investigation-and therefore do not depend on the timing structure of the game. Our main interest, however, is comparing the equilibrium payo¤s in the two Stackelberg games: an enforcer-leadership game and an o¤ender-leadership game. In the former game, enforcement is usually assumed to take the form of investigation; in the latter game, enforcement can only take the form of investigation.
Equilibrium under Di¤erent Move-Sequences

Simultaneous-Move Game
In a simultaneous-move game, both the enforcer and the o¤ender choose their strategies independently (i.e., without observing the other player's strategy choice). A simultaneousmove game re ‡ect the players' inability to commit to a strategy or their preference to keep their strategy unknown to the other player. 18 The solution concept is accordingly Nash Equilibrium (NE). The following Lemma is immediate (equilibrium strategies are marked with stars).
Lemma 1 (equilibrium strategies in a simultaneous game) The unique Nash equilibrium strategies in a simultaneous-move game are q n 2 (q; 1) and p n 2 (0; e p) satisfying v q (q n ; p n ) = 0 and u p (q n ; p n ) = 0.
Lemma 1 implies that, at the Nash equilibrium levels of non-compliance and enforcement, the marginal bene…t of each player's activity is equal to its marginal cost. At the Nash equilibrium levels, therefore, both the o¤ender and the enforcer choose an optimal response to the other player's strategy. Remark: Note that there is no equilibrium of no-compliance (since p br (1) > 0 and q br (p : p > 0) < 1) 19 or one in which the level of non-compliance is lower than or equal to q (since p br (q :) = 0 or q br (0) = 1). Similarly, there is no equilibrium of no enforcement (since q br (0) = 1 and p br (1) > 0) 20 , or one in which the level of enforcement is greater than e p (since q br (p : p > e p) = 0 and p br (0) = 0).
To illustrate the equilibrium outcome in a simultaneous-move game, consider the following example.
Then the enforcer's and the o¤ender's best response functions are:
(ii) Assume that H = = 1 and S = 0:8. Then the Nash equilibrium strategies are q n = 0:73 and p n = 0:40 (see Figure 1 ).
19 q br (p : p > 0) < 1 follows from the assumption that G 0 (1) = 0. 20 p br (1) > 0 follows from the assumption that c 0 (0) < H.
As Figure 1 shows, the enforcer's reaction curve passes through the uppermost points of her iso-payo¤ curves. At these points, the marginal bene…t from enforcement is equal to its marginal cost. Similarly, for all enforcement levels left to the zero-pro…t curve, the o¤ender's reaction curve passes through the rightmost points of his iso-payo¤ curves (the o¤ender's best response is to fully comply for all other levels of enforcements). At these points, the marginal bene…t from non-compliance is equal to its marginal cost. Because the enforcer takes the level of non-compliance as given in a simultaneous-move game, compliance (deterrence) cannot be the aim of enforcement. Instead, the purpose of enforcement is the prevention or remediation of harm.
21 Compliance (deterrence) in a simultaneous-move game is a by-product of the enforcer's goal of preventing or remedying harm. It follows that the portion of preventable harm, , and the magnitude of harm, H, but not the magnitude of the sanction, S, a¤ect the enforcer's reaction curve.
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Enforcer-Leadership Game
We now turn to the case in which the enforcer acts as a Stackelberg leader. We assume that in an enforcer-leadership game, the enforcer commits to spend enforcement resources in an observable, irreversible and unconditional way; for example, the enforcer may enter into employment contracts which are costly to breach or make irreversible investment in detection devices. The o¤ender's level of non-compliance, in turn, constitutes a best response to the enforcer's strategy. In choosing a level of enforcement, therefore, the enforcer takes into account the e¤ect of her strategy on the o¤ender's strategy. The solution concept is Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE).
An alternative modeling choice of the enforcer's commitment to an enforcement strategy is for the enforcer to commit to spend enforcement resources if and only if the o¤ender chose not to comply. Speci…cally, the enforcer commits to p = 1 if q > 0 and to p = 0 otherwise. The o¤ender's best response, in turn, is to fully comply. Besides the fact that this form of conditional commitment is of little theoretical interest, it is costly to establish and is not likely to be credible. We focus instead on the case in which the enforcer spends enforcement resources before the o¤ender chooses a level of non-compliance, thereby avoiding the issue of the credibility of the enforcer's threat to investigate noncompliance.
In an enforcer-leadership game, the enforcer chooses p 2 [0; 1] to solve (2), where q is substituted by the o¤ender's best-response function, q br (p), given by (4). The enforcer's 21 The literature on inspection games usually does not motivate the enforcer's incentive to incur enforcement costs. Here, we emphasize that the enforcer's incentive to do so results from her ability to prevent or rectify harm for non-compliance. 22 For example, as , the portion of preventable harm, approaches zero, the enforcer's expected payo¤ from harm prevention approaches zero; accordingly, the equilibrium level of non-compliance approaches 1 for any magnitude of sanction. 23 Note that an increase in the sanction makes the o¤ender's best-response curve steeper-i.e., more elastic-but does not a¤ect the enforcer's reaction curve, as the sanction is costless to the enforcer. This leads to a new NE in which the levels of non-compliance and enforcement are lower as compared to the initial NE ( dq n dS < 0, dp n dS < 0). This result contrasts Tsebelis '(1990) argument that in a game-theoretic model, the penalty has no e¤ect on crime. See also Hirshleifer and Rasmussen (1992) . problem is to choose p 2 [0; 1] to minimize:
The enforcer never chooses a level of enforcement greater than e p, because the o¤ender's best response to p > e p is to fully comply. The enforcer's payo¤ from choosing e p is consequently greater than her payo¤ from choosing p 2 (e p; 1]: The enforcer, moreover, never chooses a level of enforcement lower than the Nash equilibrium level, p n : To see why, note that the o¤ender's best response to p < p n is q > q n and that the enforcer's best-response to q > q n is p > p n . But because the enforcer's payo¤ is decreasing along her reaction curve, the enforcer's Nash equilibrium payo¤ is greater than her payo¤ from choosing as a leader p > p n . It follows that the enforcer's Nash equilibrium payo¤ is greater than her payo¤ from choosing as a leader p < p n .
The enforcer chooses p 2 [p n ; e p], where her optimal choice is either e p (i.e., a corner solution) or p b p satisfying the following …rst order condition:
The …rst term is the enforcer's marginal cost from increasing the probability of detection. The second term is the enforcer's marginal bene…t from preventing harm, taking the o¤ender's level of non-compliance as given (direct e¤ect). Observe that at p n (i.e., the enforcer's NE strategy), the sum of the …rst two terms is zero. The third term is the enforcer's marginal bene…t from inducing compliance (strategic/deterrence e¤ect).
The enforcer's optimal probability of detection is given by
The o¤ender's equilibrium level of non-compliance is, accordingly, q e = q br (p e ).
Lemma 2 (equilibrium strategies in an enforcer-leadership game) The SPE in an enforcer-leadership game is either q e = 0 and p e = e p (full-compliance equilibrium) or q e > 0 and p e < e p (partial-compliance equilibrium).k
Remark:
In an enforcer-leadership game, the role of enforcement is to induce compliance and to prevent or remediate harm from non-compliance (if q e > 0). The enforcer's choice of level of enforcement induces either full compliance or partial compliance. The equilibrium outcome-full compliance or partial compliance-depends on the elasticity of the o¤ender's reaction curve: If the o¤ender's reaction curve is su¢ ciently elastic (inelastic), then the equilibrium is one of full compliance (partial compliance). For example, if 24 u e p is the derivative from the left of u e with respect to p.
the sanction is su¢ ciently low, the o¤ender's optimal choice of level of non-compliance is relatively insensitive to the enforcer's probability of detection. Because the enforcer's costs of inducing compliance are relatively high, inducing partial compliance is optimal for the enforcer. 25 If, in contrast, the sanction is su¢ ciently high, the o¤ender's optimal choice of the level of non-compliance is relatively sensitive to the enforcer's probability of detection. Because the enforcer's costs of inducing compliance are relatively low, inducing full compliance is optimal for the enforcer.
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Proposition 1 (enforcer-leadership versus simultaneous game) In comparison to a simultaneous-move game, an enforcer-leadership game is characterized by (1) more compliance (q e < q n ), (2) more enforcement (p e > p n ) (3) higher equilibrium payo¤ for the enforcer (u e > u n ), and (4) lower equilibrium payo¤ for the o¤ender (v e < v n ).k
To see why the enforcer commits to a higher level of enforcement (part 2), recall that, in a simultaneous-move game, the enforcer equates the marginal bene…t and cost from enforcement given the o¤ender's equilibrium level of non-compliance (see (6)). In an enforcer-leadership game, in contrast, the enforcer takes into account the e¤ect of her strategy on the o¤ender's choice of level of non-compliance (see the third term in (12)). This implies that at the enforcer's NE strategy, p n , there is an additional marginal bene…t to the enforcer from increasing the probability of detection. Because the enforcer as a leader can choose her NE strategy and thereby guarantee her NE payo¤, any deviation from her NE strategy must increase her equilibrium payo¤ (part 3).
To see why the level of non-compliance is lower relative to a simultaneous-move game (part 3), recall that the o¤ender's best response function is decreasing with p for p 2 [0; e p). This, together with the fact that the level of enforcement in an enforcerleadership game is higher than the Nash equilibrium level, implies that the level of noncompliance is lower than the Nash equilibrium level. Finally, because the level of enforcement is higher than the Nash equilibrium level and the o¤ender's payo¤ is decreasing along his reaction curve, the o¤ender's equilibrium payo¤ is lower than in a simultaneous-move game (part 4).
Intuitively, because this is a game of competition with strategic substitutes from the offender's perspective, the enforcer enjoys a …rst-mover advantage relative to a simultaneousmove game: The enforcer gains from inducing the o¤ender to decrease his level of noncompliance by committing to a higher level of enforcement. Because the o¤ender's payo¤ is decreasing along his reaction curve, the o¤ender's payo¤ is lower than in a simultaneous-move game. The o¤ender thus su¤ers a second-mover disadvantage relative to a simultaneous-move game.
O¤ender-Leadership Game
25 If S = 0, then the o¤ender's reaction curve is inelastic for all p 2 [0; 1) (see Figure 2) . 26 In contrast to a simultaneous-move game, an increase in the sanction either increases or decreases the level of enforcement. To see this, note that in a full-compliance equilibrium the level of enforcement decreases with S; whereas in a partial-compliance equilibrium the level of enforcement may either increase or decrease with S.
Consider now the case where the o¤ender acts as a Stackelberg leader. In an o¤ender-leadership game, the o¤ender irrevocably chooses an observable level of non-compliance. The enforcer's level of enforcement, in turn, constitutes a best response to the o¤ender's level of non-compliance. The o¤ender therefore takes into account the e¤ect of his strategy on the enforcer's strategy. As in an enforcer-leadership game, the solution concept is SPE.
As mentioned in the Introduction, an o¤ender-leadership game underlies enforcement settings that involve the investigation of criminal or administrative o¤enses. In these settings, the o¤ender cannot retroactively alter his choice of level of non-compliance. The enforcer chooses a level of enforcement (i.e., investigation) after having observed the o¤ender's level of non-compliance.
In an o¤ender-leadership game, the o¤ender chooses q 2 [0; 1] to maximize (1), where p is substituted by the enforcer's best-response function, p br (q), given by (7). The o¤ender chooses q 2 [0; 1] to maximize:
The o¤ender never chooses a level of non-compliance smaller than q, because the enforcer's best response to q < q is to not enforce. The o¤ender's payo¤ from choosing q is consequently greater than his payo¤ from choosing q 2 [0; q): The o¤ender, moreover, never chooses a level of non-compliance higher than the Nash equilibrium level, q n . To see why, note that the enforcer's best response to q > q n is p > p n and that the o¤ender's best response to p > p n is q < q n . But because the o¤ender's payo¤ is decreasing along his reaction curve, his Nash equilibrium payo¤ is greater than his payo¤ from choosing as a leader q 2 (q n ; 1]: It follows that the o¤ender's Nash equilibrium payo¤ is greater than his payo¤ from choosing as a leader q > q n .
The o¤ender therefore chooses q 2 [q; q n ], where his optimal choice is either q (a corner solution) or q _ q satisfying the following …rst order condition:
The …rst two terms in (15) represent the o¤ender's marginal net bene…t (or cost) from increasing the level of non-compliance, given the enforcer's probability of detection. Observe that at q n (i.e., the o¤ender's NE strategy), the sum of the …rst two terms is zero. The last term re ‡ects the o¤ender's additional marginal cost from increasing q stemming from the higher level of enforcement induced by a higher level of non-compliance (strategic/inducement e¤ect). The o¤ender's optimal level of non-compliance is given by 27 We assume that p 000 ( ) > 0 so that (15) Lemma 3 (equilibrium strategies in an o¤ ender-leadership game) The SPE in an o¤ender-leadership game is either q o = q and p o = 0 (no-enforcement equilibrium) or q o > q and p o > 0 (partial-enforcement equilibrium).k
Remark: As in a simultaneous-move game, the role of enforcement in an o¤ender-leadership game is to prevent or remediate harm from non-compliance, rather than to induce compliance. In contrast to a simultaneous-move game, however, compliance (deterrence) results also from the o¤ender's strategic response to the fact that a higher level of non-compliance induces more enforcement. The equilibrium outcome-partial enforcement or no enforcement-depends on the elasticity of the enforcer's reaction curve: if the enforcer's reaction curve is su¢ ciently elastic (inelastic), then the equilibrium is one of no enforcement (partial enforcement). 29 The next Proposition compares the equilibrium outcomes in an o¤ender-leadership game and a simultaneous-move game. Although the method of enforcement is di¤erent in these games (i.e., investigation versus monitoring), comparing them serves as an analytical step towards comparing the two Stackelberg games.
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Proposition 2 (o¤ ender-leadership versus simultaneous game) In comparison to a simultaneous-move game, an o¤ender-leadership game is characterized by (1) more compliance (q o < q n ), (2) less enforcement (p o < p n ), (3) higher equilibrium payo¤ for the enforcer (u o > u n ), and (4) higher equilibrium payo¤ for the
To see why the o¤ender chooses a lower level of non-compliance (part 1), recall that in a simultaneous-move game the o¤ender equates the marginal bene…t and cost from non-compliance given the enforcer's equilibrium level of enforcement. In an o¤ender-leadership game, in contrast, the o¤ender takes into account the e¤ect of his strategy on the enforcer's choice of level of enforcement (see the third term in (15)). This implies that at the o¤ender's NE strategy, q n , there is an additional marginal cost to the o¤ender from increasing the level of non-compliance. Because the o¤ender as a leader can choose his NE strategy and thereby guarantee his NE payo¤, any deviation from his NE strategy must increase his expected payo¤ (part 4).
To see why the level of enforcement is higher relative to a simultaneous-move game (part 2), recall that the enforcer's best-response function is increasing with q. This, together with the fact that the o¤ender's level of non-compliance in an o¤ender-leadership 29 For example, if enforcement costs are linear in the probability of detection (i.e., if c(p) = cp, for some constant c > 0), then the enforcer's best response correspondence is perfectly elastic at q = q (see Figure 5 ). The o¤ender can therefore induce p = 0 (i.e., no-enforcement) by choosing his Nash strategy. 30 Moreover, Proposition 2 always holds if enforcement is more e¢ cient in a simultaneous-move than in an o¤ender-leadership game-more precisely, if for any cost of enforcement, the probability of detecting non-compliance is higher in a simultaneous-move game than in an o¤ender-leadership game. game is lower than the Nash equilibrium level, imply that the enforcer's level of enforcement is lower than the Nash equilibrium level. Finally, because the level of noncompliance is lower than the Nash equilibrium level and the enforcer's payo¤ is decreasing along his reaction curve, the enforcer's equilibrium payo¤ is higher in an o¤ender-leadership versus a simultaneous-move game (part 3).
Intuitively, because this is a game of competition with strategic complements from the enforcer's perspective, the o¤ender enjoys a …rst-mover advantage relative to a simultaneousmove game: The o¤ender as a leader gains from inducing the enforcer to lessen her level of enforcement by choosing a lower level of non-compliance. Because the enforcer's payo¤ is decreasing along her reaction curve, the enforcer gains (relative to a simultaneous-move game) from this lower level of non-compliance. The enforcer thus enjoys a second-mover advantage relative to a simultaneous-move game.
We conclude this Section by illustrating the equilibrium outcomes in the di¤erent leadership games using the speci…c functions given in Example 1. As Figure 2 shows, in each Stackelberg equilibrium, the leader's iso-payo¤ curve is tangent to the follower's reaction curve. Example 2 illustrates that, although the level of non-compliance is lower in an enforcerleadership game than in an o¤ender-leadership game, the enforcer's equilibrium payo¤ is higher as a follower than as a leader. The next Section more closely compares the equilibrium outcomes in the di¤erent leadership games. 5 Enforcer-versus O¤ender-Leadership Game
Enforcer' s Equilibrium Payo¤
We now turn to the question of whether the enforcer's equilibrium payo¤ is higher as a leader or as a follower; that is, whether the enforcer should commit to an enforcement strategy or let the o¤ender move …rst. This question arises, in particular, if the enforcement technology in an enforcer-leadership game is based on investigation. Before proceeding to compare the equilibrium strategies and players'payo¤s in the Stackelberg games, we summarize the results of Propositions 1 and 2 in Consider …rst Part (2). Recall from Propositions 1(2) and 2(2), respectively, that the equilibrium level of enforcement is higher in an enforcer-leadership game than in a simultaneous-move game (p e > p n ) and is higher in a simultaneous-move game than in an o¤ender-leadership game than (p n > p o ). It follows that the enforcer's level of enforcement is higher in an enforcer-leadership game than in an o¤ender-leadership game.
Next, consider Part (4). Recall from Proposition 2(4) and 3(4), respectively, that the o¤ender su¤ers a second-mover disadvantage and enjoys a …rst-mover advantage: The o¤ender's equilibrium payo¤ is higher in a simultaneous-move game than in an enforcerleadership game (v n > v e ) and is higher in an o¤ender-leadership game than in a simultaneous-move game (v o > v n ). It follows that the o¤ender's equilibrium payo¤ is higher in an o¤ender-leadership game than in an enforcer-leadership game (that is, his equilibrium payo¤ is higher as a leader than as a follower).
To prove parts (1) and (3), we consider three examples that illustrate that the relation between the enforcer's equilibrium payo¤ as a leader versus as a follower depends on the relation between the enforcer's …rst-and second-mover advantage. The …rst two examples consider cases in which the enforcer has either no …rst-mover advantage or no secondmover advantage. The third example considers a case in which the enforcer's …rst-and second-mover advantages depend on the model parameters. These examples also show that the level of non-compliance may be either higher or lower in an enforcer-leadership game relative to an o¤ender-leadership game.
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Example 3 (no punishment).
We proceed by showing that, if there is no sanction for non-compliance, the enforcer has no …rst-mover advantage but has a second-mover advantage. The enforcer's equilibrium payo¤, consequently, is higher as a follower than as a leader.
When there is no sanction for non-compliance, the o¤ender's best response correspondence (see (6)) is
(17) implies that the o¤ender chooses to fully not comply for p 2 [0; 1) and is indifferent between any level of non-compliance for p = 1 (see …gure 3(a)). To see why, note that if there is no sanction for no-compliance, the o¤ender's marginal cost of increasing the level of non-compliance is zero. Because the marginal bene…t from non-compliance is always positive, the o¤ender maximizes his payo¤ for any p 2 [0; 1) by choosing the highest level of non-compliance. 
. In contrast, q e < q o does not imply that u e > u o . To see this, suppose an enforcer-leadership game is characterized by full compliance (q e = 0) and an o¤ender-leadership game is characterized by no enforcement (p o = 0). Then the enforcer's equilibrium payo¤ is higher in an enforcer-leadership game than in an o¤ender-leadership game i¤ c(e p) < qH: In particular, if q is su¢ ciently small, then u o > u e .
level of non-compliance (because his payo¤ is zero for any level of non-compliance). It follows that the equilibrium strategies in an enforcer-leadership game are the NE strategies (q e = q n , p e = p n ) and that the enforcer's equilibrium payo¤ as a leader is identical to her Nash equilibrium payo¤ (i.e., u e = u n ); the enforcer thus has no …rst-mover advantage.
If the o¤ender acts as a leader, in contrast, his problem is to maximize (1 p br (q))G(q). This implies that the o¤ender equates the marginal bene…t from non-compliance and its marginal cost. Because a higher level of non-compliance induces a higher level of enforcement, the o¤ender faces a positive marginal cost of increasing the level of noncompliance. The o¤ender's optimal level of non-compliance must be lower than 1, because the o¤ender's marginal bene…t at q = 1 is zero. Finally, because the o¤ender chooses to comply with positive probability as a leader but not as a follower, the enforcer has a second-mover advantage but not a …rst-mover advantage.
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Example 4 (linear enforcement costs). Suppose that enforcement costs are linear in the probability of detection () c(p) = cp for some constant c > 0).
We proceed by showing that, if enforcement costs are linear in the probability of detection, the enforcer does not have a second-mover advantage, but has a …rst-mover advantage. The enforcer's equilibrium payo¤, consequently, is higher as a leader than as a follower.
When enforcement costs are linear in the probability of detection, the enforcer's best response correspondence (see (10)) is
(18) implies that the enforcer chooses to not enforce for q < q; to fully enforce for q > q, and is indi¤erent about the level of enforcement for q = q (see Figure 3(b) ). This follows because, for q > (<)q, the marginal bene…t from enforcement is greater (smaller) than its marginal cost . The o¤ender as a leader can therefore induce no-enforcement by choosing a level of non-compliance in…nitesimally smaller than the Nash equilibrium level. A limit argument suggests that the o¤ender's equilibrium strategy as a leader is his NE strategy (q o = q n ) and that the enforcer's equilibrium strategy as a follower is to not enforce (p o = 0). The enforcer's equilibrium payo¤ as a follower is consequently identical to his Nash equilibrium payo¤ (i.e., u o = u n ; recall that, for q = q n , the enforcer's equilibrium payo¤ is invariant to the probability of detection); the enforcer has no second-mover advantage.
If the enforcer acts as a leader, in contrast, she faces a downward-sloping reaction curve of the o¤ender. The enforcer can therefore induce a lower level of non-compliance as compared to a simultaneous-move game. This implies that the enforcer's equilibrium payo¤ as a leader is greater than her Nash equilibrium payo¤ (i.e., u e > u n ); the enforcer enjoys a …rst-mover advantage. Because the enforcer enjoys a …rst-mover advantage but not a second-mover advantage, the enforcer's equilibrium payo¤ is higher as a leader than as a follower. The same result would obtain if the cost of enforcements were c(p) = c 0 if if p > 0 p = 0 for some c > 0 so that the enforcer can detect the o¤ender with any probability if she spends a …xed cost of c.
Example 5 (linear gains). Suppose the o¤ender's gains are linear in the level of non-compliance (i.e., G(q) = qG for some G > 0), enforcement costs are given by c(p) = p 2 , and = 1. Then, letting = G G+S
).
We prove in Appendix A the more general case in which c(p) = p k ; where k > 1. If the o¤ender's gains are linear in the level of non-compliance, the o¤ender's best-response correspondence (see (6)) is
(19) implies that the o¤ender chooses to fully not comply for p < , to fully comply for p > , and is indi¤erent about the level of non-compliance for p = (see Figure 3(c) ). This follows because, for p > (<) , the marginal bene…t from non-compliance is smaller (greater) than its marginal cost. The enforcer as a leader can therefore induce full compliance by choosing a level of enforcement in…nitesimally higher than the Nash equilibrium level. A limit argument suggests that the enforcer's equilibrium strategy as a leader is her Nash equilibrium strategy (p o = p n ) and that the o¤ender's equilibrium strategy as a follower is to fully comply (q o = 0). Given linear gains from non-compliance, therefore, the enforcer has the greatest …rst-mover advantage: she can induce full compliance by choosing her Nash equilibrium strategy. Whether the enforcer's equilibrium payo¤ is higher if she moves …rst or second depends on the magnitude of her …rst-versus secondmover advantage. This depends, in turn, on the relation between the magnitude of the sanction and the o¤ender's gains from non-compliance.
To see this, note that the enforcer's Nash equilibrium payo¤ is q n (1 p n )H (p n ) 2 , her equilibrium payo¤ as a leader is (p n ) 2 , and her equilibrium payo¤ as a follower is
2 . The enforcer's …rst-and second-mover advantages are therefore respectively. The …rst expression is the di¤erence between the enforcer's equilibrium payo¤ as a leader and her Nash equilibrium payo¤; the second expression is the di¤erence between the enforcer's equilibrium payo¤ as a follower and her Nash equilibrium payo¤.
The enforcer's second-mover advantage is greater than her …rst-mover advantage i¤
That is, the enforcer prefers to move second if her gains from the lower enforcement costs as a follower are greater than her loss from the greater expected harm as a follower.
, and p n = , gives
This inequality implies that the enforcer prefers to move …rst if > 4 5
; to move second if < . Thus, as the costs of enforcement in an enforcer-leadership game ((p e ) 2 = 2 ) become su¢ ciently high, the enforcer's saving in enforcement costs as a follower outweighs her lower expected harm as a leader. It follows that if the sanction is su¢ ciently low relative to the gains from non-compliance, the enforcer's payo¤ is higher as a follower than as a leader.
More generally, whether the enforcer's payo¤ is higher as a leader or as a follower depends on the relation between her …rst-and second-mover advantage. Each advantage depends on the strategic e¤ects in the di¤erent leadership games: the greater the deterrence e¤ect in an enforcer-leadership game, the greater the enforcer's …rst-mover advantage; the smaller the inducement e¤ect in an enforcer-leadership game, the greater the enforcer's second-mover advantage. More speci…cally, the more responsive an o¤ender-follower is to a given increase in the level of enforcement, the greater the enforcer's …rst-mover advantage will be. Similarly, the less responsive is an enforcer-follower to a given decrease in the level of non-compliance, the greater the enforcer's second-mover advantage will be. As the previous examples showed, the magnitude of the enforcer's …rst-and second-mover advantages depend on the sanction for non-compliance, as well as the enforcement and non-compliance technologies.
Comparative Statics
To further explore the di¤erences between an enforcer-leadership game and an o¤ender-leadership game, we compare in this Section the e¤ect of an increase in the magnitude of the sanction (S ), the magnitude of the harm (H ), or the cost of the sanction on the equilibrium strategies and payo¤s in the two leadership games. This comparison sheds additional light on the direct and strategic e¤ects of an increase in the leader' s strategy on the follower' s response in the two games.
Proposition 4 (e¤ ect of an increase in sanction or harm on the equilibrium strategies in the leadership games)
(1) In an enforcer-leadership game: (i) As the harm increases, the level of enforcement increases and the level of non-compliance decreases. (ii) As the sanction increases, the level of enforcement may either increase or decrease, whereas the level of non-compliance decreases.
(2) In an o¤ ender-leadership game: (i) As the sanction increases, the level of non-compliance and the level of enforcement decrease. (ii) As the harm increases, the level of non-compliance decreases, whereas the level of enforcement may either increase or decrease.
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Proof. See Appendix B.
The following Table presents the results of Proposition 4:
q# p"# q# p" O¤ender-leadership: q# p# q# p"# Table 2 : E¤ect of an increase in S or H on equilibrium strategies
As the harm increases, the enforcer' s marginal bene…t from detecting the o¤ender, given a …xed level of non-compliance, increases, because enforcement now prevents or remediates a greater harm. For the same reason, the enforcer' s marginal bene…t from deterring non-compliance also increases with the harm. The higher marginal bene…t from enforcement thus causes the enforcer-leader to choose a higher level of enforcement. Because noncompliance and enforcement are strategic substitutes from the o¤ender' s perspective, the o¤ender as a follower chooses a lower level of non-compliance.
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A similar reasoning applies to the e¤ect of an increase in the sanction on the o¤ender-leader' s choice of a level of non-compliance. As the sanction increases, the o¤ender' s marginal costs of increasing the level of noncompliance-given a …xed level of enforcement-increases, because a detected o¤ender now faces a higher sanction. For the same reason, the o¤ender' s marginal cost of increasing the level of non-compliance and thereby inducing a higher level of enforcement also increases with the sanction. The higher marginal cost from non-compliance causes the o¤ender-leader to choose a lower level of non-compliance. Because enforcement and non-compliance are strategic complements from the enforcer' s perspective, the enforcer as a follower chooses a lower level of enforcement.
35
The e¤ect of an increase in the sanction on the enforcer-leader' s choice of a level of enforcement is more subtle. The enforcer' s marginal bene…t from detecting the o¤ender-given a …xed level of non-compliance-is not a¤ected by the magnitude of the sanction. However, because an increase in the sanction induces the o¤ender-follower to choose a lower level of non-compliance for any level of enforcement, the enforcer' s marginal bene…t from detecting non-compliance is now lower. The enforcer' s marginal bene…t from deterring non-compliance, in contrast, is greater because a higher sanction renders enforcement more e¤ective; for each level of enforcement, the o¤ender' s best response involves a lower level of non-compliance. Thus, the enforcer' s marginal bene…t from enforcement either increases or decreases as the sanction increases. Accordingly, the level of enforcement and the magnitude of the sanction are either complementary or substitute enforcement instruments.
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The e¤ect of an increase in the harm on the o¤ender-leader' s choice of a level of non-compliance is similarly ambiguous. The o¤ender' s marginal cost of increasing the level of non-compliance-given a …xed level of enforcementincreases with the harm, because the enforcer' s best response now involves a higher level of enforcement for any level of non-compliance. However, the o¤ender' s marginal cost of increasing the level of non-compliance and thereby inducing a higher level of enforcement may either increase or decrease, depending on the elasticity of the enforcer' s (shifted) best response curve.
To resolve this indeterminacy, we assume that, as in the simultaneous-move game, non-compliance and enforcement are strategic substitutes from the of-34 An increase in the harm in an enforcer-leadership game has only indirect e¤ect on the level of non-compliance, through its (positive) e¤ect on the level of enforcement.
35 An increase in the sanction in an o¤ender-leadership game has only indirect e¤ect on the level of enforcement, through its (negative) e¤ect on the level of non-compliance.
36 The level of non-compliance necessarily decreases because both the direct e¤ect (holding the level of enforcement …xed) and the indirect e¤ect (through the (positive) direct e¤ect on the level of enforcement) of an increase in the sanction on the level of non-compliance are negative.
fender' s perspective.
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This assumption implies that the o¤ender-leader' s marginal cost of increasing the level of non-compliance increases with the magnitude of the harm and therefore that the level of non-compliance decreases as the harm increases. The enforcer-follower' s level of enforcement, in contrast, may either increase or decrease: Although the increase in the harm increases the marginal bene…t from enforcement (direct e¤ect), the o¤ender' s lower level of non-compliance decreases it (indirect e¤ect).
The next proposition considers the e¤ect of an increase in the magnitude of the sanction or the harm on the enforcer' s and the o¤ender' s equilibrium payo¤s:
Proposition 5 (e¤ ect of an increase in sanction or harm on the equilibrium payo¤ s in the leadership games) (a) As the sanction increases, the enforcer' s equilibrium payo¤ increases and the o¤ ender' s equilibrium payo¤ decreases.
(b) As the harm increases, the o¤ ender' s equilibrium payo¤ decreases, whereas the enforcer' s equilibrium payo¤ decreases if she is the leader but either increases or decreases is she is the follower.
Interestingly, an increase in the harm does not necessarily decrease the enforcer' s equilibrium payo¤ as a follower. On one hand, given a …xed level of non-compliance, the enforcer' s payo¤ decreases with the magnitude of the harm. On the other hand, because the enforcer' s level of enforcement increases as the harm increases, the o¤ender is more reluctant as a leader to increase his level of non-compliance. If the e¤ect of an increase in the harm on the o¤ender-leader' s choice of a level of non-compliance is su¢ ciently high, the enforcer' s equilibrium payo¤ increases with the magnitude of the harm.
Finally, we consider in Appendix C the case in which the sanction is costly to the enforcer (see Propositions 4A and 5A). We show, somewhat surprisingly, that as the cost of the sanction to the enforcer increases, the o¤ender' s payo¤ as a follower may decrease. Although the enforcer' s marginal bene…t from detecting non-compliance-and thereby imposing a more costly sanctiondecreases, her marginal bene…t from deterring non-compliance increases. As the cost of the sanction increases, therefore, the enforcer-leader may resort to a more aggressive enforcement strategy, which in turn results in a lower equilibrium payo¤ for the o¤ender. The intuitions for the other results are similar to the ones provided for Proposition 4 and are therefore omitted.
Conclusion
This paper considers the role of commitment in enforcement games when enforcement can remediate or prevent harm from non-compliance. We examined a one-shot game in which an o¤ender chooses a level of non-compliance and an enforcer chooses a level of enforcement. We showed that the enforcer enjoys both a …rst-mover and a second-mover advantage relative to a simultaneous-move game. The enforcer realizes his …rst-mover advantage by choosing a higher level of investigation as compared to a simultaneousmove game, thereby inducing a lower level of non-compliance. The enforcer's secondmover advantage stems from the fact that the o¤ender exploits his leadership position by choosing a lower level of non-compliance as compared to a simultaneous-move game. Whether the enforcer prefers to move …rst by committing to an enforcement strategy or rather let the o¤ender move …rst thus depends on the relation between her …rst-versus second-mover advantage.
We further showed that the enforcer's …rst-mover advantage depends on the responsiveness of the o¤ender as a follower to a change in the level of enforcement. The enforcer's second-mover advantage, in contrast, depends on her own responsiveness as a follower to a change in the level of non-compliance. The value of commitment to the enforcer thus hinges on the relative responsiveness of each player-the o¤ender and the enforcer-to the other player's strategy. In particular, the enforcer prefers to be a follower if the o¤ender is relatively unresponsive to a change in the level of enforcement; for example, if the sanction for non-compliance is su¢ ciently low. In contrast, the enforcer prefers to be a leader if she is relatively responsive to a change in the level of non-compliance; for example, if the enforcement technology exhibits constant marginal returns.
Appendix A
In this Appendix, we prove a generalized version of example 4.
Suppose the o¤ender's gains are linear in the level of non-compliance (i.e., G(q) = qG for some G > 0), enforcement costs are given by c(p) = p k , where k > 1, and = 1:
re ‡ects the relation between the gains from and sanction for non-compliance.
Proof. First, note that c(0
From (6) and (10), the o¤ender's best response correspondence and the enforcer's best response functions, respectively, are
where e p . From Lemma 1 we have the the following Lemma:
Lemma A1 (equilibrium strategies in a simultaneous game) The unique equilibrium strategies in a simultaneous-move game are q n = k 1 k H and p n = .
Next, consider an enforcer-leadership game. Since the enforcer as a leader can induce full compliance by choosing p = e p + " for some " > 0; it follows that the o¤ender's best response function in an enforcer-leadership game is
Now, since u(e p; 0) > u(p 0 ; 0) for p 0 2 (e p; 1], the enforcer's equilibrium strategy is p = e p Lemma A2 (equilibrium strategies in an enforcer-leadership game) (i) The unique SPE strategies in an enforcer-leadership game are q e = 0 and p n = .
(ii) The enforcer's equilibrium payo¤ is u e = k :
Consider now an o¤ender-leadership game. From (15) we have
Plugging p br (q) = (
Solving for q o gives
The enforcer's equilibrium strategy, p br (q) = (
Lemma A3 (equilibrium strategies in an o¤ ender-leadership game) (i) The unique SPE strategies in an o¤ender-leadership game are
Finally, comparing the enforcer's equilibrium payo¤ in an enforcer-versus o¤ender-leadership game shows that u e > ( ) u o if and only if < ( )
k . In particular, for k = 2; the enforcer prefers to move …rst if and only if < Proposition 4 (e¤ ect of an increase in sanction or harm on the equilibrium strategies in the leadership games)
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Proof. Consider the following system:
Totally di¤erentiating each equation with respect to t gives:
+ F qp dp dt
Solving for dq dt and dp dt
and dp dt
We will apply these general results in the proof of Proposition 4.
(1) In an enforcer-leadership game, the enforcer' s problem is
The maximand is the enforcer' s payo¤ (see (2)). The constraint ensures that the o¤ender' s level of non-compliance is a best response to the enforcer' s level of enforcement.
The Lagrangian is
The enforcer' s optimal level of enforcement and the o¤ender' s corresponding level of non-compliance are obtained by solving 8 > < > :
From the second equality, we have =
: Plugging in the …rst equality, the level of enforcement and the level of non-compliance, p e and q e , are implicitly de…ned by the following system:
dq dp
where dq dp
The partial derivatives of L p and v q with respect to p and q are:
< 0 (by assumption);
The partial derivatives of L p and v q with respect to S and H are:
We thus have dp
An increase in the sanction thus either increases or decreases the enforcer' s level of enforcement, but decreases the o¤ender' s level of non compliance. An increase in the harm increases the enforcer' s level of enforcement, but decreases the o¤ender' s level of non-compliance.
(2) In an o¤ender-leadership game, the level of enforcement and the level of non-compliance, p o and q o , are implicitly de…ned by the following system:
where L(p; q; ) = (1 p)G 0 (q) pqS [ c 0 (p) + q H] and dp dq
The partial derivatives of L q and u p with respect to q and p are:
L qp = (G 0 (q) + S) + H(G(q) + qS) c 00 (p) 2 c 000 (p) < 0 (by assumption); u pp = c 00 (p) < 0;
The partial derivatives of L q and u p with respect to S and H are:
L qh = (G(q) + qS) c 00 (p) < 0; u ps = 0; u ph = q > 0:
We thus have dp 
An increase in the sanction thus decreases the enforcer' s level of enforcement and the o¤ender' s level of non compliance. An increase in the harm either increases or decreases the enforcer' s level of enforcement, but decreases the o¤ender' s level of non-compliance.
(b) As the harm increases, the o¤ ender' s equilibrium payo¤ decreases, the enforcer' s equilibrium payo¤ as a leader decreases, and her equilibrium payo¤ as a follower either increases or decreases.
Proof. We will prove the parts of Proposition 5 which pertain to the enforcer. A similar proof applies to the parts which pertain to the o¤ender.
Consider an enforcer-leadership game. Recall from (B6) that the Lagrangian is L(p; q; ) = c(p) (1 p)qH [(1 p)G 0 (q) pS]:
By the Envelope Theorem for constrained optimization, the e¤ect of an increase in S and H on the enforcer' s equilibrium payo¤ is given by the partial derivatives of the Lagrangian with respect to S and H: 
An increase in the sanction thus increases the enforcer' s equilibrium payo¤ as a leader and an increase in the harm decreases it.
Consider next an o¤ender-leadership game. To …nd the e¤ect of an increase in the sanction or the harm on the enforcer' s equilibrium payo¤ as a follower, observe that the enforcer' s problem in an o¤ender-leadership game is max p u(p; q) = c(p) (1 p )qH s.t. v q = (1 p)G 0 (q) pS dp dq ((G(q) + qS) = 0;
where dp dq = upq upp = H c 00 (p) : That is, the enforcer' s problem is to choose an optimal level of enforcement as a follower subject to the o¤ender choosing an optimal level of non-compliance as a leader.
The Lagrangian is L(p; q; ) = c(p) (1 p )qH
(1 p)G 0 (q) pS H c 00 (p) (G(q) + qS) : (B25)
By the Envelope Theorem, the e¤ect of an increase in S and H on the enforcer' s equilibrium payo¤ is given by the partial derivative of the Lagrangian with respect to S and H: An increase in the sanction thus increases the enforcer' s equilibrium payo¤, but an increase in the harm either increases or decreases it.
Therefore dp
An increase in the cost of the sanction thus either increases or decreases the enforcer' s level of enforcement, but increases the o¤ender' s level of noncompliance.
(2) In an o¤ender-leadership game, p o and q o are de…ned implicitly by the following system: 
:
The partial derivatives of L q and u p with respect to p and q are:
L qp = (G 0 (q) + S) + ( H S )c 000 (p) (c 00 (p)) 2 (G(q) + S) < 0 (by assumption); u pp = c 00 (p) < 0;
The partial derivatives of L q and u p with respect to are:
(G(q) + S) > 0;
Therefore, dp
An increase in the cost of the sanction thus either increases or decreases the enforcer' s level of enforcement, but increases the o¤ender' s level of noncompliance. Proposition 5A .(e¤ ect of an increase in cost of the sanction on the equilibrium payo¤ s in the leadership games)
As the cost of the sanction increases, the enforcer' s equilibrium payo¤ decreases, the o¤ ender' s equilibrium payo¤ as a leader increases, and his equilibrium payo¤ as a follower either increases or decreases.
We will prove the parts of Proposition 5A which pertain to an enforcerleadership game. A similar proof applies to the parts which pertain to an o¤ender-leadership game.
The enforcer' s problem is 
An increase in the cost of the sanction thus decrease the enforcer' s equilibrium payo¤ as a leader.
To …nd the e¤ect of an increase in the cost of the sanction on the o¤ender' s equilibrium payo¤ as a follower, observe that the o¤ender' s problem in an enforcer-leadership game is max q v(p; q) = (1 p)G 0 (q) pS s.t. u q = c 0 (p) + q( H S ) dq dp ((1 p )H + pS ) = 0;
The Lagrangian is L(p; q; ) = (1 p)G 0 (q) pS c 0 (p) + q( H S ) dq dp ((1 p )H + pS ) :
(C16) By the Envelope Theorem, the e¤ect of an increase in the cost of the sanction on the o¤ender' s equilibrium payo¤ is given by the partial derivative of the = qS + dq dp pS <> 0:
An increase in the cost of the sanction thus either increases or decreases the o¤ender' s equilibrium payo¤ as a follower. .
